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he General Election of May 2013 marked a Tsignificant development for Pakistan's 
democracy. The first successful transition from 
one democratically elected civilian Government 
under a civilian democratically elected President, 
to another took place. Although it was a cause 
for much optimism amongst the proponents of 
democracy, it was also received with tempered 
caution considering Pakistan's frequent, historic 
subjection to military coups. 
PILDAT, which has been assessing the quality of 
democracy in Pakistan since 2011, wanted to 
include a paper, as part of its democracy 
assessment exercise, which gave a comparative 
assessment of the quality of democracy 
especially from the perspective of stages of 
democratic transition and where exactly Pakistan 
falls in its journey towards becoming a mature 
democracy. 
This was of interest not only because of 
Pakistan's status as a democracy in transition due 
to its authoritarian past but also because 
trajectories adopted by different countries in the 
path to democratization have not been the same. 
A comparative assessment was therefore bound 
to result in conclusions useful not only to chart 
Pakistan's democratic progress but also of other 
countries around world. 
In this PILDAT paper, authored by Dr. Andrew 
Blick, Lecturer in Politics and Contemporary 
History at King's College London, with years of 
experience in assessing the quality of democracy 
PREFACE
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across nations, the author dilates not only upon 
the historic waves of democratization across the 
world, but also discusses the various factors that 
might facilitate or impede a country's democratic 
journey. These include the socio-economic 
environment, the country's experience with 
imperialism, the role of religion, the role of the 
military, etc. 
Dr. Blick also expounds upon the usage of the 
IIDEA framework for assessment of democracy 
in Pakistan as carried out by PILDAT and the 
lessons that can be garnered through it. He 
concludes by making recommendations that can 
be used to strengthen democracy not only in 
Pakistan but also in fledgling democracies across 
the world.
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Dr. Andrew Blick
The Assessment Framework and its 
Value
Democratic development is a perpetual project. 
An overview of the voluminous literature on the 
theme of democratization could create a 
misleading impression. It tends to portray 
democracy in binary terms: a state either is or is 
not democratic. Transition therefore involves 
passing from one condition to the other. From 
this perspective, the objective is to secure 
passage from non-democracy to democracy, and 
guard against subsequent reversion. 
A marginally more sophisticated approach is to 
allow for the concept of semi-democratic 
societies, alongside those that are fully 
democratic and those that are completely devoid 
of it. These outlooks have numerous flaws 
(though the body of work containing them is of 
immense value, some of which is extracted here). 
For those of us engaged in promoting democratic 
improvement through assessment of its 
performance, there are two immediate problems. 
We risk a sense of despondency and futility in a 
society deemed undemocratic, and self-
satisfaction and complacency in one classified as 
democratic. If in a halfway house, supposed 
semi-democracy, we may suffer confusion about 
how and why we found ourselves in such a 
condition, and how to pass through it to 
democracy, and avoid travelling in the opposite 
direction to non-democracy. The Quality of 
Democracy assessment framework as promoted 
by the International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance (IIDEA) offers a form of 
analysis that allows us to circumvent these 
blockages. 
Among its insights, it presents democracy as a 
nest of different but mutually supportive 
components. Democracy is the sum of many 
different parts, any one of which can be more or 
less satisfactory at any given time. We can assess 
democratic performance through considering the 
widest possible range of data, both qualitative 
and quantitative, across a broad span of the 
qualities that make up democracy. They cover 
the features most directly associated with 
democracy in the popular mind, such as 
elections, accountability of public institutions, 
and parties; and other concepts that may on the 
surface appear more tangential but are 
nonetheless equally important, including the rule 
of law, citizenship, and economic and social 
rights. At the heart of this methodology, binding 
it together is a concept of democracy as the 
combination of popular control and political 
1equality.
Using this framework, we can consider 
performance in a nuanced way, both over time 
within a given state, and in international 
comparative perspective. Rather than crudely 
describing a country as democratic or non-
democratic, or even placing it on a single scale, 
we can consider how well it is performing in a 
multitude of areas. Valuable – and possibly 
counterintuitive – insights become possible. 
I have spent many years applying the framework 
to the United Kingdom (UK), where it was first 
developed in the 1990s. The UK enjoys an 
1. For an overview of the methodology and the philosophical rationale underpinning it, see: David Beetham, Edzia Carvahlho, 
Todd Landman and Stuart Weir, Assessing the Quality of Democracy: A Practical Guide (Stockholm, International IDEA, 
2008).08
Democratic development is a 
perpetual project. An 
overview of the voluminous 
literature on the theme of 
democratization could create 
a misleading impression. It 
tends to portray democracy in 
binary terms: a state either is 
or is not democratic
2. For exploration of these issues in historic perspective, see: Andrew Blick, Beyond Magna Carta: A Constitution for the United 
Kingdom (Oxford, Hart, 2015 forthcoming).
3. For a recent overview, see: PILDAT, Assessment of the Quality of Democracy in First 100 Days of National and Provincial 
Governments: June 6 September 13, 2013 (Islamabad, PILDAT, 2013).
4. Ibid
international reputation as an early leader in the 
historic development of democracy (or at least 
some of its systemic building blocks), and there 
is certainly a tendency within the UK for self-
congratulation on this count. Yet what became 
the Quality of Democracy framework was 
developed precisely because of concerns about 
democratic malaise in the UK, and it throws up a 
variety of issues when applied to the country in 
which it originated. 
For instance, the UK is unusual internationally 
for its lack of a written Constitution. This 
absence creates various problems. It entails a 
lack of transparency, compromises the degree of 
popular ownership of Constitutional 
arrangements, and creates problems for the 
protection of human rights. 
Alongside these longstanding comparative 
deficiencies, the Framework reveals problems 
that have been worsening in recent times. In 
particular, there is growing disagreement around 
key features of UK democracy, such as 
provisions for the governance of England, the 
largest sub-component of the UK. 
Increasingly intense disputes also surround the 
issues of UK membership of the European 
Union, and UK participation in the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The Scottish 
independence movement has also made rapid 
progress in recent years, calling into question the 
2future of the UK state.
The lesson from the UK is that no assumptions 
should be made about democratic superiority. 
The picture is complex, and always changing. 
Equally, in the case of Pakistan, it is apparent 
that a story need not be wholly bleak. Successive 
PILDAT assessments reveal an overall, though 
not uniform, upward trend in the quality of 
3democracy over time.  Particular areas of relative 
strength involve the inclusiveness and 
impartiality of Constitutional Amendment 
processes, the freedom of political parties, the 
scope of the voluntary sector, and adherence to 
international law and support for the United 
Nations. 
At the same time, the purpose of these exercises 
is not to promote relativism. Clearly, though 
none are perfect, some states are more 
satisfactory in their overall democratic 
performance than others. While it is vital to 
identify positives – not least so they can be 
cultivated and expanded upon – this activity 
should not be the path to a condition of denial. 
The rigorous, comprehensive nature of the 
Quality of Democracy framework forces 
assessors to confront a range of conclusions from 
good to bad.
General improvement in Pakistan, it seems, 
builds from a relatively low base. Moreover, 
there are aspects of democratic performance 
identified by the assessors as particularly weak, 
including standards of health among the people, 
economic and social rights generally, popular 
perceptions of corruption in the public sector, 
public involvement in policies at local level, the 
extent of decentralisation, public and legislative 
impact upon external policy, and outside 
influences on the state. 
Thus while the General Election of May 2013 
saw the momentous event of 'Pakistan's first 
successful transition from one democratic 
civilian Government under a civilian 
4democratically-elected President, to another'  
deficiencies cannot be overlooked. Moreover, 
history suggests it would not be wise entirely to 
exclude the possibility of future interruptions in 
the continuity of democratic, civilian 
administrations.With this combination of 
progress and uncertainty in mind, there follows a 
consideration of democratic transition, 
emphasizing those themes that may be most 
09
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of May 2013 saw 
the momentous event of 
Pakistan's first successful 
transition from one 
democratic civilian 
Government under a civilian 
democratically-elected 
President, to another, 
deficiencies cannot 
be overlooked
pertinent from the perspective of Pakistan. It 
identifies some of the most important topics and 
debates in the literature, and seeks to draw some 
general conclusions and observations.
Historic Waves of Democratisation
Democracy is a powerful concept that has made 
impressive practical global progress over the past 
two centuries. Analysts of democratic 
development have identified a series of historic 
waves of advancement, within which it is 
possible to locate important moments in the 
5development of Pakistan.  
The first, the longest wave to date, ran roughly 
from the 1820s to the 1920s. It saw countries 
including the United States, France, the UK and 
the more autonomous parts of its Empire, and 
other European states, make significant 
democratic progress. Either side of the First 
World War countries including Italy, Argentina, 
and states in Central and Eastern Europe also 
underwent transformations in a democratic 
direction. 
The second wave commenced during the 
Second World War and ran through to the early 
1960s. Uruguay, Austria, Italy, Japan, (West) 
Germany, Korea, Argentina, Peru, Costa Rica, 
Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela all formed part 
of this phase. A contributing factor was the shift 
towards independence among former colonies of 
European powers, including Pakistan.
A third wave is identified as beginning in 
Southern Europe in the mid-1970s with the 
removal of authoritarian regimes in Portugal, 
Greece and Spain and their replacement with 
elected administrations. The pattern then spread 
to Latin and Central America during the late 
1970s and 1980s (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Peru, Salvador, Uruguay), with Asia following 
(Bangladesh, Nepal, the Philippines, the 
Republic of Korea, Taiwan). The close of a 
period of military rule in 1988 in Pakistan fitted 
into this period. 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
Communist systems collapsed, and the wave of 
change impacted in sub-Saharan Africa in the 
early 1990s. Transitions took place across varied 
locations at the end of the twentieth/beginning of 
the twenty-first centuries, and mid-way through 
the first decade of the twenty-first century, the 
'coloured revolutions' occurred (Kyrgyzstan, 
Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus). 
As this third phase of democratisation 
progressed, setbacks accompanied it. The early 
achievements in the former Soviet Union ran 
into difficulties, for instance in Belarus and 
Russia itself; and there were problems in Latin 
America (Venezuela and Colombia) and Africa 
(Zambia, Zimbabwe, Congo, Gambia) in the 
1990s. Arguably, after the 'coloured revolutions' 
period, there was a clear period of global 
reversal. 
Then the second decade of the twenty-first 
century saw another surge. Most obvious was the 
'Arab spring' of 2011 (with its most notable 
impacts in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria). But 
there were other developments in Myanmar, 
Malawi, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and Georgia. 
It was possible that the third wave was 
continuing, or perhaps another wave 
commencing. Many of these gains, however, 
proved not to be secure.
Recognition of these historic patterns suggests to 
the observer two important aspects to democratic 
development. The first involves a transition away 
from a particular regime with pronounced 
undemocratic characteristics. The second, the 
successful entrenchment of a post-authoritarian 
system. Historic phases of democratic reverse 
have followed times of breakthrough. 
The first phase of backsliding occurred in the 
1920s and 1930s, linked to the rise of Fascism, 
National Socialism and Bolshevism. In the 
5. For overviews drawn on to construct this account, see: Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 
Twentieth Century (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1992); Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: 
From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy (London, Profile, 2014); Jan Teorell, Determinants of 
Democratization: Explaining Regime Change in the World 1972-2006 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010).
Analysts of democratic 
development have identified 
a series of historic waves 
of advancement, within 
which it is possible 
to locate important
 moments in the 
development of Pakistan
10
6. Teorell, Determinants of Democratization.
7. Barrington Moore, The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World 
(Boston, Beacon Press, 1966); Isobel Coleman and Terra Lawson-Remer (eds), Pathways to Freedom: Political and Economic 
Lessons From Democratic Transitions (New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 2013) 3.
8. Ruth Berins Collier, Paths Toward Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999).
9. Seymour Martin Lipset, 'Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Legitimacy' (1959) American 
Political Science Review 53 (1): 1-22.
10. Edward Glaeser, Giacomo Ponzetto and Andrei Shleifer, 'Why Does Democracy Need Education?', Journal of Economic 
Growth (2007) 12 (7) 77-99.
11. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2006).
1930s, military power seizures afflicted Uruguay, 
Argentina, Japan and Spain. 
A second pronounced bout of regression had 
clearly come into being at the outset of the 
1960s, manifesting itself in Latin America, 
Africa, the Mediterranean, and Asia. Pakistan 
had helped inaugurate this phase with the coup 
of 1958. This phenomenon means that it is 
important to give attention both to the causes of 
democratic gains, and the conditions conducive 
to the sustenance of improvements once made. 
The position is further complicated because not 
only might the first set of factors differ from the 
second, they may even contradict each other. For 
example, a financial or economic crisis may 
serve to undermine an authoritarian regime, but 
the conditions it brings about can also create 
problems for the administration that replaces it.
Within the historical framework sketched above, 
we may define Pakistan as a democratic 
transition state. It has been part both of waves 
of progress, and also of democratic 
retrenchment. Gains are possible, and many of 
the features of democracy, outwardly at least, 
may be present. However, progress is fragile. 
Indeed, one author places Pakistan in a group of 
countries oscillating between more and less 
democratic systems, alongside Niger, Haiti, 
6Thailand and Turkey.  But what are the 
underlying sources both of democratisation and 
of resistance to it?
Socio-economic Determinants of 
Democratic Progress
Many analysts of democratic transition have 
given particular attention to the contribution of 
socio-economic trends towards the development 
or regression of democracy. Historic evidence 
shows that economic development can change 
social relations, in turn unleashing new pressures 
for democratisation. Some have seen the middle 
classes as vital both to the attainment of 
7democratic gains and their protection.  They are 
likely to be disposed to force the sharing of 
political power on pre-existing elites, and can 
contribute to a vibrant civil society. Others 
regard the working classes as the critical portion 
8of society.  
In such theses, economic development can 
enhance the power of the working classes, whose 
interest is in democratisation as a means of 
securing a more equal distribution of power and 
consequently resources.
An important socio-economic school proposes 
the importance of a range of factors grouped 
collectively under the heading of 
9'modernization'.  A basic point here is that there 
is an observable, broad connection between the 
wealth of a country and its democratic 
performance. 
A further element of modernization is improved 
levels of education, which appear to correlate 
10with advancements in the quality of democracy.   
Greater income equality also appears generally 
11to have a beneficial impact on democracy.  
Another component of modernisation said to be 
supportive of democracy is the wider permeation 
of the media, though pre-existing freedom of 
12 expression is necessary to this advance.
11
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of the working classes, 
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democratisation as a 
means of securing a 
more equal distribution 
of power and 
consequently resources
explanation from the point of view of standard 
15interpretations of democratization.  Its level of 
economic development, its vast population size, 
its ethnic and religious diversity, its 
aforementioned colonial status, do not, on the 
surface, suggest a good prognosis from the point 
of view of many conventional accounts of 
democratic propensity. 
If the previous incorporation into the British 
Empire was the reason for subsequent Indian 
achievements, why did it not work in the same 
way elsewhere – including in Pakistan? It could 
be that rather than being a direct beneficiary of 
British colonialism, India acquired democratic 
characteristics that had roots in UK political 
theory and practice despite rather than because of 
the British rulers. A possible long-term reason 
for Indian success lies in the pre-independence 
nationalist movement and its emphasis on the 
need to create a federal, secular system with full 
voting rights. In such theories, the Muslim 
League may have been less conducive to 
democratic development in what became 
Pakistan because majority of its members were 
part of the landed elite, who were less disposed 
to promote 'bourgeois' values.
In the post-independence period in India, wide 
support for the Congress Party and the existence 
of an efficient civil service were probably helpful 
factors from the perspective of the consolidation 
of democratic gains. The role of Congress as – at 
least in theory – representing the whole of India 
rather than a particular group may have been 
The Muslim League may 
have been less conducive to 
democratic development in 
what became Pakistan 
because majority of its 
members were part of the 
landed elite, who were less 
disposed to promote 
'bourgeois' values
12. Teorell, Determinants of Democratization.
13. Ibid
14. Michael Bernard, Christopher Reenock and Timothy Nordstrom, 'The Legacy of Western Overseas Colonialism on 
Democratic Survival', International Studies Quarterly (2004) 48 225-50.
15. See eg: Atul Kohli (ed) The Success of India's Democracy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001).
Separating out these different qualities and 
identifying the chain of causality is not a simple 
task. There are grounds for believing that 
modernisation contributes more to the 
entrenchment of improvements once made rather 
than their attainment. None of these connections, 
however, are absolute or apply in every case. 
Some countries – including India – have 
outperformed against expectations their 
'modernisation' level might generate, while 
others, such as Singapore, have underachieved.
The Imperial Legacy
At times it may seem that democracy, whatever 
its universal implications, is more suited to some 
countries than others. Past paths of development 
are likely to impact upon future prospects. 
Accounts of democratic progress have often 
suggested that prior incorporation into a colonial 
empire is a hindrance to later progress. 
Divide-and-rule tactics deployed by foreign 
occupiers can create a legacy of internal 
cleavage; and there may be a negative impact on 
economic advancement. However, it may be that 
in many cases the period of occupation was not 
sufficiently long to make a lasting impact upon 
13democratic propensity. 
Furthermore, some analysis differentiates 
between empires, and suggests in particular that 
the British Empire was more effective at 
14spreading a propensity for democracy.   The 
central plank of the argument in favour of the 
British Empire in this respect (excluding 
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand) is India.
Over the period of India's existence as an 
independent state, despite some problematic 
periods, especially in the mid-1970s, freely 
contested elections have taken place regularly 
and power has changed hands, which is a crucial, 
if not entirely sufficient requirement of 
democracy. 
It is important to avoid presenting an overly 
optimistic portrait. An application of the more 
nuanced modes of democratic measurement 
advocated here reveals a complex picture. There 
are serious variations of performance across 
different Indian states, and clear flaws exist, 
particularly in the socio-economic arena. 
Nonetheless, India certainly requires much 
12
Moreover, it may be that the problems faced by 
Arab countries in the Middle East and North 
Africa, probably related to oil and other 
resources, serve to distort the overall sample of 
16majority Muslim states.  
However, if it is accepted that Islam can create a 
barrier to democracy, it does not mean it is 
insuperable or must always be so. The relative 
importance of religion can change at different 
times. Nationalism was a more prominent force 
than Islam in the Arab world in the mid-
twentieth century. Furthermore, the orientation of 
religions can modify. For instance, during the 
1970s, Catholicism, having shifted from its past 
tendency to be hostile towards democracy, took 
on a more supportive role, underpinning the 
historic third wave.
A predominantly Muslim country that has been a 
site of democratic progress in recent years is 
Indonesia. It is, like Pakistan and India, a former 
European colony that obtained independence 
during second wave of democratization (i.e., in 
1949). It had been part of the Dutch Empire and 
– according to some theories – was therefore less 
democratically advantaged than Pakistan as a 
former territory of the British Empire. 
It shares with Pakistan a predominantly Muslim 
population, and is a geographically disparate 
polity, scattered across numerous islands. On 
population measures it is the fourth largest 
country in the world; and it has a Presidential 
system. Therefore, according to some of the  
general evidence and interpretations discussed 
above, it has many democratic disadvantages. In 
16. Alfred Stepan with Graeme Robertson, 'Arab, not Muslim, Exceptionalism', Journal of Democracy 15 (4) 140-46.
beneficial. The Constitution of India is seen as an 
institutional strength, with amendments to it over 
time ensuring that it continues to further 
democratic objectives. 
Some accounts emphasize the achievement of 
Indian democracy in balancing the privileged 
and the underprivileged groups, and in splitting 
power between federal and more localised 
authority. It may be that continuing to maintain 
equilibrium, particularly between the Hindus and 
other religious groups, is the major challenge to 
Indian democracy in the future.
Religion and Democracy
For many years it seemed as though democracy 
was largely associated with North Western 
Europe, and colonies in which settlers from this 
region became predominant. The second and 
third historic waves of democratization 
undermined this outlook. 
Another interpretation of democracy has been 
that certain religious dispositions may either 
facilitate or prohibit democratization. Initially, 
for some, only Protestantism was compatible 
with democracy. The third wave included within 
it many mainly Catholic countries. Confucianism 
has been another belief system held to be 
inherently resistant to democracy. Yet progress in 
Taiwan and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) 
from the late 1980s called this view into 
question. A further religion singled out as 
creating a barrier to democracy is Islam. 
An international analysis of democratic 
performance might suggest that predominantly 
Muslim countries are at a democratic 
disadvantage. Some note that it creates a 
problematic barrier to the separation of political 
from religious authority. Others associate it with 
an underprivileged social position for women. It 
is observed that democracy has lacked 
enthusiastic advocacy from political leaders in 
predominantly Muslim countries. Liberalization 
of electoral politics can lead to voters supporting 
Islamic parties that are themselves hostile to 
democracy. In Turkey, where secularisation was 
attained after the First World War, other 
democratic problems, including a politically 
interventionist army, appeared.
Yet opinion research suggests that Muslims 
internationally are as disposed towards key 
features of democracy as any other group. 
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this sense it has outperformed in recent times. A 
process beginning with the Asian economic crisis 
of 1997 led to a transition to a more democratic 
system, with the role of the army increasingly 
restrained.
The achievements in Indonesia rest on a range of 
17plausible causes.  The legacy of the long post-
independence phase of authoritarian 
Government, though clearly not wholly benign, 
is significant. It included secularism and the 
promotion of the Indonesian language, breaking 
with regional and hierarchical differences. 
Indonesia had also presented the outward 
semblance of a multi-party electoral system that 
could provide an embryo for later advances. A 
long period of economic development preceded 
1997. Religious leaders played an important role 
in promoting moderate engagement, not least Mr. 
Abdurrahman Wahid, the President from 1999-
2001, who accepted the principle of secularism. 
Popular engagement in the early period of 
transition and the role of the media prompted 
wider ownership of the reform process. Online 
social media have facilitated activism. Over the 
first decade of the twenty-first century, 
Governments pursued policies of greater 
financial transparency and welfare programmes, 
and achieved higher levels of economic growth. 
Economic inequality resultantly lessened. 
Political decentralization has taken place and the 
society has become ethnically and politically 
more inclusive. 
Specific achievements in changing the role of the 
Military included separating it organizationally 
from the police force and providing financial 
incentives for the Military to accept a reduction 
in its size and the scope of its influence. Yet 
problems remain, including the prospect of 
religious extremism.
Democratic Reform in the Context of 
the United Kingdom
Democratic reform is a long-term project. In 
Europe, for example, even the initial stages 
proved agonisingly prolonged and fragile. 
However, short- to medium-term setbacks or 
difficulties do not equate to absolute defeat. 
Those who seek to advance democracy must 
prioritise strategic gains. Short cuts, such as 
violent coup attempts, may generate more 
problems than they solve, while peaceful protest 
can achieve wider and more sustained 
momentum towards change. 
Problems that may appear insuperable to 
democratic principle can eventually be 
overcome. Such developments may take place in 
unexpected ways. To illustrate the point, it is 
useful to return to the case of the UK.
Some of the core values that underpin its system 
of Government are derived from before the 
formation of the UK as a single state, when it 
existed in separate national components. A 
crucial period in this development was the 
18seventeenth century.  In this era there were 
sustained clashes involving religion and 
ethnicity. Regional conflict on the European 
continental mainland had disruptive 
consequences for the British Isles. There were 
also clashes between two different models of 
Government: arbitrary monarchical rule on the 
one hand, and limited executive power, based 
on consultation and respect for individual 
freedoms on the other.
The differences must have seemed at times 
irreconcilable, and eventually led to a civil war 
and two revolutions. There were periods of firm 
Governmental oppression, breakdowns in public 
authority, and human suffering. In the middle of 
the seventeenth century, the army became an 
increasingly important political player in its own 
right, and eventually seized power for itself, for a 
time ruling without Parliament. During another 
period of chaos, a Dutch invasion led by William 
17. See: Joshua Kurlantzick, 'Indonesia' in Coleman and Lawson-Remer (eds), Pathways to Freedom.
18. See: Jonathan Scott, England's Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability in European Context (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2000).14
Democratic reform is a long-
term project. In Europe, for 
example, even the initial 
stages proved agonisingly 
prolonged and fragile. 
However, short- to medium-
term setbacks or difficulties 
do not equate to absolute 
defeat
of Orange forced James II off the throne in 1688.
Yet out of this very division and disarray certain 
principles, that would later contribute to the 
emergence of democracy in the UK and beyond, 
took shape. Most importantly, following the 
flight of James II, a body known as the 
'Convention Parliament' sat to consider the future 
of England. One of its products was the Bill of 
Rights of 1689, a document intended to oblige 
future rulers to adhere to a set of norms 
regarding individual freedoms, the impartiality 
of the legal system, free elections, and the 
independence of Parliament.
Both the Convention and the Bill of Rights 
would shape the constitutional future of the UK 
and inspire similar efforts internationally. Full 
democracy was still more than two centuries 
away. But the experience of the seventeenth 
century shows that out of turmoil and seemingly 
hopeless divisions can come a basis for progress.
This realization should give cause for optimism. 
But it is no basis for quietism. This pattern 
should, instead, inspire immediate action guided 
by an awareness of the wider historic panorama. 
The struggle for progress is difficult but the 
potential rewards are great.
Conclusions and Observations
Building on the foregoing discussion, as series of 
conclusions and observations are possible. 
Acknowledgement of wider global waves of 
democratisation, and of the importance of the 
past to future patterns of development, is 
necessary. But it should not lead to a sense of 
pre-determination or powerlessness. Individual 
and group initiatives can influence democratic 
19development for the better (and worse).
Some suggestions regarding possible areas of 
action follow. They are focused in particular on 
the idea of protecting and enhancing democratic 
gains once made.
i. Attention to socio-economic development 
is crucial. Economic growth is linked to the 
emergence of social groups with an interest 
in democracy, and can create an association 
between democratic progress and enhanced 
living standards. Alongside economic 
expansion, the promotion of improved 
social welfare and greater income equality 
is necessary. Improvements in educational 
standards would also seem to have 
particular value. Expansion of free media is 
to be encouraged.
ii. Procedures and practices associated with 
democracy, such as multi-party elections, 
even if not functioning entirely satisfactory, 
can, in the longer-term, help develop popular 
attachment to the democratic concept, and 
trigger unforeseen democratic improvements 
in future. Measures intended to promote the 
development of viable governing and 
opposition parties, based around policy 
programmes more than personalities or 
direct relations with client groups, should be 
20a priority.
iii. A number of options exist for reducing any 
negative democratic impact emanating from 
the armed forces. A recent work by the 
academic and former Spanish Defence 
Minister, Mr. Narcis Serra, provides useful 
guidance here. The Legislature and the 
Government, he argues, should maintain a 
close interest in changes and develop a body 
of expertise. Serra stresses that any 
meaningful reform is dependent upon a 
wider social context of democratisation, and 
must involve continuous effort over a 
sustained period of time rather than a short 
spell of forced change. The senior Defence 
Minister, he holds, should be a powerful 
figure, and a civilian. Different branches of 
the armed forces should become properly 
coordinated. Another necessary area of 
reform Serra identifies is military justice that 
19. For a work including this philosophy, see eg: Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds), 
Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1986).
20. See: Nic Cheeseman et al., Politics Meets Policies: The Emergence of Programmatic Political Parties (Stockholm, 
International IDEA, 2014).
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Measures intended to 
promote the development 
of viable governing and 
opposition parties, based 
around policy programmes 
more than personalities 
or direct relations 
with client groups, should be 
a priority
must cease to be a means of ensuring 
impunity. If the military has an intelligence 
branch focused on domestic affairs, then 
interference in internal democracy is hard to 
avoid. The overall process of reform 
should as far as possible involve the 
21Military itself.
iv. There is a clear connection between the 
position of the Military in Pakistani society 
and the relationship with India. An effort at 
reducing tensions between these 
neighbours could contribute to a 
democratization of the role of the armed 
forces, as well as help create the type of 
hospitable regional environment that is 
conducive to democratic development.
v. Specific reforms, such as changes to the 
Constitutional text, can have a positive 
democratic impact. But their execution must 
take into account the wider environment 
within which they are expected to operate. 
Attention to the proper consideration and 
22sequencing of change is therefore vital.  For 
instance, the devolution of power under a 
Federal or Quasi-federal system can bring 
democracy closer to citizens. But its 
effectiveness depends partly on the capacity 
of the institutions wielding newly dispersed 
powers properly to perform their new 
responsibilities. The downward transfer of 
powers to areas dominated by one particular 
group at the cost of minorities is another 
potential problem to take into account. 
Similarly, reforms intended to stimulate 
economic activity, if they involve the 
transfer of previously publicly owned 
holdings into the private sector, require 
caution. If sufficient development in the rule 
of law has not taken place in advance of 
such initiatives, it may entrench the position 
of economic-political elites able to subvert 
democratic processes, as occurred in post-
Soviet Ukraine.
vi. Every state has a different combination of 
democratic strengths and weaknesses, and 
the particular path it should follow towards 
improvement and consolidation must be its 
own. There is no single prescription. 
However, an important feature underlying 
any democratic success is the development 
of a democratic culture. Components of 
democracy must be seen as collectively 
owned. The rule of law, for instance, entails 
an impartial system of justice and protection 
from arbitrary treatment for all, and is more 
than simply the property of lawyers. Equally 
crucial is group commitment at elite level to 
an environment conducive to post-election 
power transitions. Those required to leave 
office must be willing to accept this 
outcome, and must have reason for 
confidence that those replacing them will 
behave properly towards them.
21. Narcis Serra, The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2010).
22. See eg: Coleman and Lawson-Remer (eds), Pathways to Freedom.16
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